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WHEN MORAL REASONING AND ETHICS TRAINING
FAIL: REDUCING WHITE COLLAR CRIME
THROUGH THE CONTROL OF
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVIANCE
CYNTHIA A. KOLLER,* LAURA A. PATTERSON,**
& ELIZABETH B. SCALF***
INTRODUCTION
The contribution of unprincipled behavior and mortgage fraud in
the United States to the global economic meltdown of 2008, and the
subsequent, enduring recession, continues to kindle academic and
political discourse.  This is evident not only in the proliferation of
research and publication on the topic,1 but in the first presidential
debate of 2012 between incumbent Barack Obama and challenger Mitt
Romney.  President Obama, responding to Governor Romney’s state-
ments on the potential repeal and replacement of the Dodd-Frank Act,2
had this to say:
The reason we have been in such a[n] enormous economic crisis
was prompted by reckless behavior across the board.  Now, it
wasn’t just on Wall Street.  You had loan officers [were—] that
were giving loans and mortgages that really shouldn’t have been
given, because the folks didn’t qualify.  You had people who were
borrowing money to buy a house that they couldn’t afford.  You
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania.
Ph.D., University of Cincinnati.
** Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania.
Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park.
*** Senior Legal and Compliance Counsel, Heartland Advisors, Inc.  J.D., Mar-
quette University Law School.
1. See 16 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW AND DEVIANCE: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CRIME
(Matthieu Deflem ed., 2011); see also CYNTHIA A. KOLLER, WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN HOUS-
ING: MORTGAGE FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES (2012); see also  Accumulation, Dispossession,
and Debt: The Racial Logic of Global Capitalism—An Introduction, 64: 3 AM. Q. 361 (2012).
2. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A
CHEAT SHEET 3 (2010), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/uploads/images/sum-
marydoddfrankact.pdf.  The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010:
implements changes that, among other things, affect the oversight and supervi-
sion of financial institutions, provide for a new resolution procedure for large
financial companies, create a new agency responsible for implementing and
enforcing compliance with consumer financial laws, introduce more stringent
regulatory capital requirements, effect significant changes in the regulation of
over the counter derivatives, reform the regulation of credit rating agencies,
implement changes to corporate governance and executive compensation prac-
tices, incorporate the Volcker Rule, require registration of advisers to certain
private funds, and effect significant changes in the securitization market.
Id.
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had credit agencies that were stamping these as A1 great invest-
ments when they weren’t.  But you also had banks making money
hand over fist, churning out products that the bankers themselves
didn’t even understand, in order to make big profits, but knowing
that it made the entire system vulnerable.3
President Obama summarized the “reckless” behavior succinctly, but he
failed to underscore the criminal activities that accompanied the
demise of the U.S. housing finance market, or how these combined
with other factors to fuel an economic crisis around the world.  Evi-
dence of this illegal behavior continues to mount, with unprecedented
numbers of civil lawsuits and criminal complaints now being routinely
filed across the U.S. (with judgments and restitution in the billions of
dollars and extended prison terms anticipated).  These legal actions,
coupled with accounts of what transpired to create the housing crisis,
have painted a relatively clear picture of what fraudulent activities led to
the meltdown.4  What remains to be seen is how the mortgage finance
industry reached this point of disrepute and collapse, and to identify
which factors can best explain the criminogenic environment that
materialized within the industry and the crime events that ensued.
Consistent with the notion of specialized access,5 the opportunity
perspective on white collar crime,6 and the focus on industry and orga-
nizational factors which contributed to mortgage origination fraud,7
the current review examines the context in which fraud occurred within
the housing finance industry under the perspective of Routine Activities
Theory.  The purpose of the present Article is to use subprime mort-
gage fraud to further illuminate the viability of an environmental
approach to explain, prevent, and control white collar crime.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the nature and
extent of the recent mortgage crisis.  It illustrates how fraud in the
1990s and early 2000s was committed by unprecedented numbers of
motivated offenders, while innovative and untested lending tools (such
as subprime mortgages) simultaneously presented suitable targets in
the absence of regulation and capable oversight.  This review will pro-
vide the reader with a basic understanding of the growth, scope, and
consequences of mortgage fraud in the U.S. through the early 2000s.
Part II describes how criminological theory has been used to
explain occupational and organizational white collar crime, how eco-
nomic boom/bust periods are cyclical and predicated on certain fac-
3. President Barack Obama, Presidential Debate at the University of Denver (Oct.
3, 2012) (transcript available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/presidential-
debate-transcript-denver-colo-oct/story?id=17390260).
4. See KOLLER, supra note 1.
5. See Marcus Felson, The Routine Activity Approach: A Very Versatile Theory of Crime, in
EXPLAINING CRIMINALS AND CRIME: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 43
(Raymond Paternoster & Ronet Bachman eds., 2001).
6. See MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S. SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN OPPORTU-
NITY PERSPECTIVE (Chester Britt et al. eds., 2009).
7. See Tomson H. Nguyen & Henry N. Pontell, Mortgage Origination Fraud and the
Global Economic Crisis: A Criminological Analysis, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 591 (2010).
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tors, and how routine structures and activities within businesses and
industries combine to produce opportunities for employees and com-
panies to violate the law.  Part III discusses the nature and intent of
contemporary corporate compliance and ethics programming, changes
made in the regulation of the housing finance industry since the mort-
gage crisis, and how deficits in any of these areas can produce/contrib-
ute to criminogenic business environments.
Part IV suggests that when moral reasoning, ethics training, com-
pliance programs, and/or regulation fail to inhibit criminal activities
within businesses or industries, improving an organization’s or system’s
ability to control opportunities for deviance may be a more effective
deterrent strategy to regulate behavior and prevent white collar crime.
The Article concludes with a discussion of how an environmental and
situational approach to explaining and understanding individual and
group deviance poses implications for corporate, regulatory, and finan-
cial policy, criminal investigations, and future white collar crime
research.  Insights from housing industry practitioners to explain the
opportunity structure of mortgage fraud and these other issues are used
throughout the narrative to illustrate critical points and concepts.
I. MORTGAGE CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES
The fallout from the economic bust of 2008 and the contribution
of fraud in the housing finance industry to this crisis continues to rever-
berate through U.S. monetary markets as well as the enforcement agen-
cies tasked with regulating them.8
A. Subprime Mortgage Lending
Three particular legislative actions have been credited with stimu-
lating the birth of the subprime industry.  These included the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Money Control Act of 1980
(“DIDMCA”), the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982,
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.9  In combination, this legislation
essentially created the subprime business as it allowed lenders to charge
8. See Complaint, People v. JP Morgan Sec. LLC, 2012 WL 4479076 (N.Y. Sup. 2012)
(No. 0451556-20012), for the lawsuit against JP Morgan Chase (formerly Bear Stearns) for
mortgage related frauds.  The complaint reads: “Defendants’ misconduct in connection
with their due diligence and quality control processes constituted a systemic fraud on
thousands of investors.” See id. at 3.  It goes on to say: “Defendants’ representations about
their due diligence process were materially false and fraudulent . . . .” Id. at 17.  Further-
more, “due diligence reviewers were made to understand that because the loans could
not be undone, a thorough reevaluation of loan quality was unnecessary, and even point-
less.” Id. at 18. Also note, “the review process itself—which gave underwriters and Team
Leads discretion to approve but not to reject loans—was set up so as to make approval of
a loan the path of least resistance.” Id. at 20–21.  The Defendants “disregarded Clayton’s
[JPMorgan’s contracted due diligence firm] findings of defective loans up to 65% of the
time in the third quarter of 2006 alone.” Id.
9. See RICHARD BITNER, CONFESSIONS OF A SUBPRIME LENDER: AN INSIDER’S TALE OF
GREED, FRAUD, AND IGNORANCE (2008); Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pen-
nington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 88 FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
LOUIS REV. 31 (2006).
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higher interest rates and fees (exceeding state limits), to offer adjusta-
ble interest rate mortgages (“ARMs”) and balloon payment options,
and allowed individuals to begin taking home mortgage interest tax
deductions.  Although other changes preceded these acts in the late
1960s through the 1970s, such as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Equal
Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, it was not until the
enactment of the DIDMCA that the business of subprime lending
became a standard “legal” financing alternative/enterprise.10
In addition to the legislative activity that positioned otherwise
uncreditworthy borrowers to enter into exchange relationships with
lenders, market changes also “contributed to the growth and matura-
tion of subprime loans.”11  Brokerage and securitization were key ele-
ments in this growth (and in the industry’s segmentation), as it gave
traditional and non-traditional (non-depository) lenders the ability to
supply and deliver creative financing and credit, while simultaneously
passing on its accompanying risk.  In sum, during a relatively short
period of time, the general mortgage process as it exists today in the
U.S. experienced considerable change since the days of localized
lending.
Moreover, the federal government played a critical role in the
modifications to this industry by enabling and encouraging securitiza-
tion and off-balance sheet lending (pass through financing), particu-
larly through the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”).12  For example,
while FIRREA (adopted in the wake of the Savings & Loan crisis)13
attended to bank lending and appraisal regulation, it also encouraged
10. Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 9, at 38.
11. Id. See also Manuel B. Aalbers, Wrong Assumptions in the Financial Crisis, 5 CRITI-
CAL PERSP. ON INT’L BUS. 94, 95 (2009) (arguing that “subprime lending should not be
defined as lending to borrowers with poor credit, but as lending at higher fees and inter-
est rates whether or not borrowers actually have bad credit”); Gerald H. Lander et al.,
Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue, 16 INT’L. ADVANCES IN. ECON. RES. 1, 2
(2009) (defines subprime lending as “predatory lending” or the offering of subprime
loans to individuals who qualify for prime loans, as some borrowers are subjected to
higher costs for reasons other than credit risk).
12. Aalbers, supra note 11, at 94; see also Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).  For a discussion
of how a similar statute, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, assists the
Department of Justice in prosecuting financial fraud, particularly money laundering, see
Leslie A. Dickinson, Note, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 579 (2014).
13. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Regulatory Enforcement: Using FIRREA to Prosecute Financial
Fraud, D&O DIARY (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:49 AM), www.dandodiary.com/2013/08/articles/
failed-banks/regulatory-enforcement-using-firrea-to-prosecute-financial-fraud/print.html.
FIRREA is seeing increased applicability in response to financial fraud:
There are a number of reasons that FIRREA has proved to be an attractive
option for prosecutors and regulators. As the law firm memo notes, FIRREA has
a lengthy statute of limitations, an arguably low burden of proof, and the [sic]
also provides the government with the ability to issue administrative subpoenas
to conduct a civil investigation in advance of filing a civil complaint.
Id.
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the Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”)14 to facilitate lending
opportunities to low and moderate-income individuals.  With most new
subprime lenders operating as non-banks, however, these regulations
proved to be more ideal than real in the overall scheme of mortgage
financing.
Growth continued to move in an upward trend from 1995 forward,
with subprime lending making up 0.74% of the market share in the
early 1990s to almost 9% by the year 2000; between 2002 and 2003,
subprime originations increased another 56-62%.15  Although it is clear
that different data sources vary in their estimates,16 one thing is certain:
the subprime product enjoyed virtual overnight popularity and quickly
became a major component of not only the U.S. financial structure, but
by mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”)17 and, by extension, the global
economy as well.
Likewise, during the 1990s, the number of new independent mort-
gage brokers increased 14% annually; by the year 2000, “30,000 mort-
gage brokerage firms employed an estimated 240,000 workers and
accounted for approximately 55% of all mortgage originations.”18  The
14. KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21663, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED
ENTERPRISES (GSES): AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 1, 3 (2007). Kosar explains:
GSEs are instrumentalities, not agencies, of the United States. This distinction is
both legally and administratively important. The federal government’s control
over an institution differs significantly depending upon whether that institution
is an agency or instrumentality. An agency (as defined in Title 5, Part 1 of the
United States Code) is managed directly through the federal management hierar-
chy. As a general rule, an agency is subject to all general management laws and
regulations provided in the United States Code unless it is exempted from such
coverage either in its enabling statute, or by virtue of being part of an exempted
class of agency. Thus, an agency is subject to federal appointment of its senior
officers (often requiring Senate confirmation), to civil service and federal pro-
curement laws, and to the federal budget and other direct federal management
controls, unless exempted.
Id.
15. See Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 9, at 41.
16. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, Measuring the Effect of Subprime Lending on
Neighborhood Foreclosures: Evidence from Chicago, 40 URB. AFF. REV. 362 (2005); see also Chom-
sisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 9, at 41.
17. See Edward L. Glaeser & Hedi D. Kallal, Thin Markets, Asymmetric Information, and
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 6 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 64, 68, (1997) (“Mortgage-backed
securities are ‘pass through’ securities where the initial lender still services the mortgages;
the lender collects fees and then passes through interest and principal to owners of the
bundled mortgages”).  Glaeser and Kallal explain that the main issuers of conforming
MBSs are the GSEs, who bundle these products for sale to dealers such as Salomon Broth-
ers and Bear Sterns for resale to pension and mutual funds. See also Andrea Heuson et al.,
Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availabil-
ity, 23 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 337, 337 (2001).  In the secondary market of MBSs:
a monopolist sells mortgage-backed securities, which yield a liquidity benefit, in
exchange for mortgages offered by originators. The monopolist/securitizer sets
both the price for these mortgages and the credit-quality standard that qualifies
a mortgage for purchase. Although credit scoring ensures that originators do
not enjoy an information advantage over the securitizer, they do enjoy a ‘first
mover advantage’ in selecting which qualifying mortgages to sell.
Id.
18. Immergluck & Smith, supra note 16, at 365.
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concern here is that mortgages originated by brokers are twice as likely
to be subprime than those originated by lenders.
The growth of subprime lending in the 1990s was attributable to a
variety of market and industry factors.  These include, but are not lim-
ited to: consumer demand, rising interest rates, declining loan origina-
tions in the prime market, bundling and securitizing of subprime loans
into MBSs, and the number of new non-depository finance companies
(mortgage brokerage firms).  Despite the benefits of this growth to
homebuyers and the other participants in the mortgage finance contin-
uum, change is typically accompanied by unintended consequences;
the rapid expansion of the U.S. housing market and the manner in
which the industry developed was “clearly excessive” and problematic.19
It is clear that the rapid infusion of these new demands, products, and
players into a traditionally risk-based/risk-averse industry may have
undermined its ability to foresee or manage that risk.
As illuminated herein, from the initial borrower to final investors,
financial risk was not evenly distributed throughout the subprime mort-
gage chain, and this contributed to a host of industry and participant
behavior which many believe led to its eventual destruction.  As others
contend, the meltdown of the subprime market was predictable and
inevitable: with the lack of information transparency in the process, and
its asymmetrical structure (profits retained by some and losses borne by
others), the system promoted short-sighted, risky behavior, and was
never truly sustainable.20
B. Subprime Mortgage Crisis
By the early 2000s, continued expansion of the subprime market
appeared limitless as demand for U.S. MBSs began to multiply around
the world.  For example, by the end of 2006, nearly 20% of MBSs
(agency and non-agency issued; unregulated mortgage securities) were
funded by foreign investors, up from 6% in 1994.21  By mid-2006, China
alone “held approximately $108 billion in MBSs, up substantially from
$3 billion in 2003 and $100 million in 2002.”22  Although this interna-
tional infusion of capital helped maintain low U.S. interest rates, it also
provided a seemingly infinite source of mortgage funds; a boom situa-
tion that was clearly unsustainable.
A variety of factors led to the subsequent subprime crisis, which
continues to be manifested in record mortgage defaults and foreclo-
sures, reduced housing values, and record business exits and bankrupt-
cies.23  The crisis has been attributed to a combination of interest rate
19. Philipp M. Hildebrand, The sub-prime crisis: A central banker’s perspective, 4 J. FIN.
STABILITY 313, 314 (2008).
20. Id. See also James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar
Crime, 93 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1987); Joseph E. Stiglitz, It Doesn’t Take Nostradamus, ECONO-
MIST’S VOICE, Nov., 2008, at 1.
21. See Lander et al., supra note 11, at 7.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Yuliya S. Demyanyk, Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages, 91 FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ST. LOUIS REV. 79, 79 (2009).
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resets (maturity of ARMs), fraud, poor underwriting of subprime loans
(inattention to risk), the temporary nature of subprime loans, discrimi-
nation, a housing market slowdown, and an overall deterioration of
loan quality.24  These factors eventually created a financial emergency
that could no longer be ignored by even the most casual observer.
C. Mortgage Fraud
Fraud comes in many forms and has been credited with playing a
substantial role in the downfall of the subprime mortgage market over
the past two decades.  Virtually all commentaries on the mortgage crisis
have included some reference to the fraudulent activities of partici-
pants, ranging from home buyers to the rating agencies and beyond.
Where each author places the blame is driven by their own interpreta-
tions of the empirical and anecdotal evidence, but all agree that many
participants in the housing finance industry crossed the line from risky
and unethical behavior to outright fraud in their pursuit of property or
profit.  Suffice it to indicate here that fraud in the mortgage industry
has been perpetrated through material misrepresentations and manip-
ulations across the board.25  The Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work (FinCEN) explains this in familiar terms:
Mortgage loan fraud can be divided into two broad categories:
fraud for property and fraud for profit. Fraud for property gener-
ally involves material misrepresentation or omission of informa-
tion with the intent to deceive or mislead a lender into extending
credit that would likely not be offered if the true facts were
known . . . In contrast, the motivation behind fraud for profit is
money. Fraud for profit is often committed with the complicity of
industry insiders such as mortgage brokers, real estate agents,
property appraisers, and settlement agents (attorneys and title
examiners).26
FinCEN contends that these illegal trends and patterns are supported
by its analysis of thousands of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)27 filed
over the years.  One lender summarizes how the problems and deviance
reflected in reports such as SARs became endemic:
It got to the point where mortgages were investments to be bought
and sold, and local lenders just weren’t big enough to take advantage of
pooling of these mortgages.  So the secondary market arose, looking
again at the buy-ability of pooling these groups of mortgages, and then
rating them and my understanding, a lot of the bond-rating companies
were giving better ratings so that investors would buy these pools of
24. Id.
25. For a more complete analysis of the types of fraud throughout the U.S. housing
finance industry, see KOLLER, supra note 1.
26. FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, MORTGAGE LOAN FRAUD: AN INDUS-
TRY ASSESSMENT BASED UPON SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS 3, (2006), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/MortgageLoanFraud.pdf.
27. Id.  Federal law requires SARs to be submitted to the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network (FinCEN) by financial businesses which encounter incidents of suspected
money laundering or fraud.
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mortgages.  So again, it was the fox watching the henhouse.  I mean there
was not a lot of oversight there and I think you could go back to the Fed
and say there should have been more oversight with how those mort-
gages were pooled.28
A capitalistic financial system is understandably built on motivation
for property or profit, but predatory and fraudulent activity compro-
mise the process; subprime lending becomes predatory when lenders
target unqualified or undereducated potential borrowers (unethical) or
fraudulent when misrepresentations occur (illegal).29  Consumers are
also motivated by the pursuit of property and profit, and thus predatory
borrowing and fraud is also commonplace.  In sum, individuals and orga-
nizations have been involved in fraudulent practices through opportu-
nities provided by subprime mortgage products and their
accompanying processes.  For all parties beyond the initial borrower,
these frauds can be subsumed under the phenomenon of white collar
crime.
II. THEORIES EXPLAINING WHITE COLLAR CRIME
Understanding the causes of financial crime on the scale of the
subprime mortgage crisis requires a theoretical focus on opportunity
structures and relaxed or ineffective oversight (e.g., guardianship).
Economic crises emerging from financial institutions and industries
over the past three decades reveal similar elements and patterns.30  The
subprime mortgage crisis, like other financial crises, conformed to a
classic lending boom-bust cycle.31  This precarious cycle is well-docu-
mented: deregulation promotes unchecked financial innovation;
unprecedented investor demand for these financial securities increases;
underwriting standards become attenuated; and, little consumer pro-
tection is available.32  For example, there was a lack of transparency in
28. See KOLLER, supra note 1, at 394.
29. See Lander et al., supra note 11, at 3.
30. E. Philip Davis & Dilruba Karim, Could Early Warning Systems Have Helped to Pre-
dict the Sub Prime Crisis?, 206 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 35, 44 (2008) (contends there are
generic patterns evident prior to most financial crises, including: (1) Regime shifts, first
to laxity (such as deregulation) which provokes a credit cycle, later to rigour (e.g., mone-
tary tightening) that triggers a crisis; (2) Easing of entry conditions to financial markets,
leading to heightened competition and risk taking; (3) Debt accumulation and asset price
booms, generating vulnerable balance sheets in the financial and nonfinancial sectors;
(4) Innovation in financial markets, which increases uncertainty during the crisis; and (5)
Risk concentration and lower capital adequacy for banks, which reduces robustness to
shocks).
31. Yuliya S. Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396; see also Giovanni Dell’Ariccia
& Robert Marquez, Lending Booms and Lending Standards, 61 J. FIN. 2511 (2006).
32. E´ric Tymoigne, Securitization, Deregulation, Economic Stability, and Financial Crisis,
Part II: Deregulation, the Financial Crisis, and Policy Implications, Levy Econ. Inst., Working
Paper No. 573.2 14, 26 (2009).  For a discussion on the intersection of white collar crime,
federal securities law, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, see
G. Robert Blakey & Michael Gerardi, Eliminating Overlap or Creating a Gap?  Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Private Securities Litgation Reform Act of 1995 and RICO, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 435 (2014).
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complex MBSs and obscure derivatives in the developing mortgage
boom,33 and there was inadequate assessment and management of risk
over life expectancy of these investments.34  These factors contributed
to short-term profits for those with the foresight to bundle and offload
risky subprime mortgages to unwitting investors, while jeopardizing the
long-term health of the entire system.
These patterned features contributed to a predictable financial cri-
sis with global repercussions.  The Savings & Loan scandals of the
1980s, the corporate crime of the 1990s, and the recent subprime mort-
gage-lending crisis of the past decade have altered our conventional
conceptualizations and accounts of white collar crime.  The focus on a
professional offender who holds a high position of fiduciary trust is
shifting to an interest in organizational cultures and opportunities
within a firm or industry that are conducive to illegal activities.35
Therefore, a truly substantial explanation must explore white collar
crime as criminality, and as a criminal event (a crime).
This Part explores some theoretical approaches to identifying cor-
porate cultures, organizational incentive structures, and economic pres-
sures endemic to the financial crises emerging over the past three
decades.36  The literature supports that the subprime mortgage market
capitalized on exclusive access to opportunities and means to offend.
The mortgage industry insiders possessed specialized skills, relied on
deceptive practices conducted within private domains, and leveraged
this knowledge to violate public trust.37
We also introduce a conceptual framework for understanding how
the subprime lending industry moved from boom to bust.  Routine
Activity Theory38 offers a guide for what conditions are necessary and
sufficient for a crime to occur.  This theory posits that a crime requires
the convergence in time and space of a motivated offender, a suitable
target, and the absence of a capable guardianship (see Figure 1).
33. Stiglitz, supra note 20, at 2.
34. James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS RESERVE 403 (2009).
35. In 1939, Edwin Sutherland advanced the definition of “white collar crime” as
“crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his
occupation.” See Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1940).
36. The crises characterize financial opportunities that served to privatize profits
and socialize risks. In the case of subprime mortgage lending, certain economic condi-
tions served to convert accepted investment strategies into fraudulent practices.
37. The question remains whether the stakeholders understood the market dynam-
ics well enough to capitalize or cash in on the innovation, the fraud, and its diffusion.
38. Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A
Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588 (1979).
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FIGURE 1: BASIC MODEL OF ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY39
Crime
Event
Lack of Capable
Guardianship
Suitable Target
Motivated Offender
Situational opportunities for crime are structured by routine activi-
ties (e.g., encounters or interactions), which increase the probability
suitable (e.g., profitable and vulnerable) targets will intersect with moti-
vated offenders in the absence of guardianship (e.g., formal or informal
controls).  As formulated, it offers a situational theory of crime40 that is
well-suited to help explain white collar criminality and crime.
Joseph Sheley synthesized four key elements most commonly cited
in the literature to explain criminal behavior.41  Building on the rou-
tine activity perspective, he considers motivation (desire to offend),
freedom from social constraints (impunity from negative costs), skill
(specialized knowledge), and opportunity.  Opportunity is integral to
integrating these explanatory concepts into a coherent explanation of
corporate crime.42  A prerequisite for white collar criminal opportuni-
ties is access to exclusive professions, businesses, and industries.  In gen-
eral, access is limited to those with specialized skills who hold positions
of fiduciary trust within organizations with actual or projected legiti-
macy.43  These necessary elements are evident in the innovative sub-
prime mortgage products marketed to borrowers and the MBSs sold to
investors (suitable targets) by financial institutions (opportunity) and
commission-based brokerages (motivation), in the context of enabling
legislation (absence of restraints or control) and conventional (and
evolving unconventional) business practices.
Explaining white collar crime under one succinct criminological
theory such as Routine Activities Theory has been a challenge, to say
39. For a more thorough theoretical model, see A Theory of Crime Problems, CENTER
FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (Apr. 8, 2014, 10:44 PM EST), http://www.popcenter
.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm.
40. Ronald V. G. Clarke, “Situational” Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice, 20 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 136, 137 (1980).
41. Joseph F. Sheley, Critical Elements of Criminal Behavior Explanation, 24 SOC. Q.
509, 510 (1983).
42. BENSON & SIMPSON, supra note 6, at 124.
43. Michael L. Benson et al., White-Collar Crime from an Opportunity Perspective, THE
CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 175, 184–85 (Sally S. Simpson & David Weisburd
eds., 2009).
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the least.44  Nevertheless, the routine activities and opportunity per-
spectives aid us in examining how individuals and aggregates might
take advantage of occupational, organizational, and industrial routines
to access rewarding crime opportunities.  That being said, we turn our
attention to motivation or what factors influence a respectable and
legitimate professional to engage in white collar crime.
Felson argues, “[t]he motives of ‘white-collar’ criminals do not set
them apart from other criminals.”45  As such, we need to understand
how these motivated offenders (individuals and organizations) find
opportunities to deviate within their conventional work routines and
structures, and how these otherwise law-abiding employees and entities
come to engage in illegal behavior.
Early research revealed that a relatively small number of corpora-
tions accounted for a disproportionate amount of white collar crime.46
Furthermore, some types of industries were found to be more fertile
ground for crime than others, and within certain industries, some firms
were more involved in illegal actions than others.  In other words, a
small number of companies accounted for a disproportionate number
of white collar crimes committed, suggesting divergent motivational or
opportunity structures even within industries.  To explain the pattern of
offending both across and within types of organizations, it was argued
that responsibility lay within the practice of business itself.  That is,
some industries (and some firms within industries) possess a set of
norms that are “favorable to the violation of law.”47  Corporate crime
reflects a culture within an industry that sponsors normative approval of
illegal acts, with a perverse system of incentives to reward compliance
and sanctions to address noncompliance with this expectation of
deviance.48
Strain Theory advances a role for economic strain (or the inability
to achieve economic goals) as relevant to explanations of illegal occupa-
tional and organizational activities.49  Applied to white collar crime,
motivations are rooted in a “culture of competition” and conveyed
though organizational subcultures.50  Performance in this context of
competition and uncertainty creates pressure to meet goals using any
44. Felson, supra note 5.  Similarly, see Gerald Cliff & Christian Desilets, White Collar
Crime: What It Is and Where It’s Going, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2014)
for a discussion on the changing definition of white collar crime.
45. MARCUS FELSON, CRIME AND EVERYDAY LIFE 96 (Steve Rutter et al. eds., 3d ed.
2002).
46. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 76 (1949).
47. Id. at 255.
48. Robert J. Apel & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding “Criminogenic” Corporate
Culture: What White-Collar Crime Researchers Can Learn from Studies of the Adolescent Employ-
ment-Crime Relationship, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 15, 17 (Sally S. Simp-
son & David Weisburd eds., 2009).
49. See e.g., Lynn Langton, Can General Strain Theory Explain White-Collar Crime? A
Preliminary Investigation of the Relationship Between Strain and Select White-Collar Offenses, 35 J.
CRIM. JUST. 1 (2007), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2006.11.011.
50. See Coleman, supra note 20, at 1.
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means necessary.51  Edward Gross52 argues that corporations are goal-
directed entities evaluated in terms of their collective effectiveness in
achieving the bottom-line.  Goal blockage may reflect any financial diffi-
culties confronted by a company’s declining profits, threats by competi-
tors, and/or ratio of liabilities to assets.  When goal orientations focus
exclusively on outcomes without regard for the “means-to-the-ends,”
then illegal or unethical avenues to those goals become viable.
In capitalist economies, corporations work to maximize profits and
to minimize loss.  General Strain Theory expects that corporations, and
their top managers, are more likely to turn to white collar crime when
legitimate means to attain these economic goals are blocked.53  Sociolo-
gists argue that criminal propensities cross all classes; however, through
corporate accessibility, the elite classes tend to have more attractive
options or choices when confronted with strain or difficulties achieving
goals.  For instance, Robert Merton’s Strain Theory proposed that adap-
tations to economic strain might include compliance, innovation, ritu-
alism, retreatism or rebellion.54  It has been argued that the privileged
classes ascribe a more positive value to risk-taking (innovation), have
greater access to illegal or unethical opportunities (entitlements), and
are subject to weaker social controls (within private domains).55
The nature of the criminal act (intentional deceptive practices), in
our view, stems more from an organizational culture, rather than a sta-
tus or respectable role held by the offender; organizational factors drive
corporate crime.56  According to Friedrichs, “white collar crime—espe-
cially the most substantial and serious forms, including state-organized
and corporate crime—is carried out on a group or organizational
level.”57  Corporations sponsor cultures reflecting the values, orienta-
tions, and expectations that will guide managers and business prac-
tices.58  That is, organizational factors significantly influence rational
choice or individual decision-making within a corporate setting.59  In
essence, we are explaining the corporate crime or “collective behavior”
51. Robert Agnew, Nicole L. Piquero & Francis T. Cullen, General Strain Theory and
White Collar Crime, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, supra note 48, at 35.
52. Edward Gross, Organizational Crime: A Theoretical Perspective, in 1 STUDIES IN SYM-
BOLIC INTERACTION 55 (1978).
53. Agnew et al., supra note 51, at 35.
54. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 41 (1957).
55. John Hagan & Fiona Kay, Gender and Delinquency in White-Collar Families: A Power-
Control Perspective, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 391, 404–405 (1990).
56. See e.g., Amitai Etzioni & Derek Mitchell, Corporate Crime, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AN CORPORATE CRIME 187 (Henry Pontell & Gilbert Geis
eds. 2007).
57. DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPO-
RARY SOCIETY 226 (Carolyn Henderson Meier et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
58. Peter C. Yeager, Understanding Corporate Lawbreaking: From Profit-Seeking to Law-
Finding, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR AND CORPORATE CRIME, supra
note 56, at 25; see also Maurice Punch, Suite Violence: Why Managers Murder and Corporations
Kill, 33 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 243 (2000).
59. Nguyen & Pontell, supra note 7; see also Raymond Paternoster & Sally S. Simp-
son, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate
Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549 (1996); and NEAL SHOVER & ANDREW HOCHSTETLER,
CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (2006).
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carried out on an organizational level on behalf of social entities or
organizations.60
Others, however, criticize theoretical explanations that assign
human attributes to corporate entities.61  In essence, any model that
attributes individual motivation or action to a corporate-level organiza-
tion is simply misspecified.  Presumably, corporate crime may not occur
apart from the decisions, actions, or personal proclivities of its manag-
ers.  Simply put, corporations are not people, capable of learning, or
possessing motivation and intent.  Vaughan echoes the objection not-
ing that causal principles used to explain individual criminality are not
appropriate or sufficient to explain the criminality of corporations.62
On the other hand, Gross argues that corporations “take on a life
of their own.”63  There is evidence that corporations respond to exter-
nal pressures, market, and/or regulatory changes, by modifying busi-
ness practices.  Some organizations will adhere to conventional,
accepted business practices, irrespective of the market conditions.
These adaptations adjust expectations (profit/risk ratios) to ride out a
tight market (low-risk ritualistic or compliant responses).  Other firms
within an industry may sponsor different goal orientations (innovation)
with a premium placed on short-term performance rather than long-
sighted values (e.g., perpetuity and reputation based on fiduciary trust).
Hyman Minsky argued that over an extended period of “good
times,” economies tend to move from a financial structure grounded in
sound, long-term investments to a structure engaged in speculative and
Ponzi finance.64  This was true of the subprime lending crisis.  Sub-
prime mortgage-lending set up a “bull market” offering opportunities,
high-yield returns, and short-term risks for all key components in the
industry.  The “American Dream” promoted the homeownership ideal,
commission-driven brokers solicited subprime borrowers (suitable or
“technically” eligible targets), lending institutions invented teaser or
hybrid products (adjustable rate, no documentation loans, etc.), risky
subprime mortgages were bundled and securitized to attract investors,
and guardians and regulators were either complicit or inept.  As one
can imagine, this type of increasingly uncertain market environment
facilitates fraud.  When industries experience economic strain, success
by any means may be rewarded and executed with little scrutiny.65
60. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME: ISSUES IN
RESEARCH (2005); see also Marshall B. Clinard & Peter C. Yeager, Corporate Crime: Issues in
Research, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 255 (1978).
61. See Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research, in 1
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 31 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds., 1989).
62. Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organiza-
tions, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 23 (1998).
63. Gross, supra note 52.
64. Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of
Bard College, Working Paper No. 74, 7–8 (1992), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=161024.
65. Marilyn Price & Donna M. Norris, White-Collar Crime: Corporate and Securities and
Commodities Fraud, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 538, 541 (2009).
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The opportunity to exploit the leading edge of a “boom-bust” cycle
is available to all industry insiders.  Why do some organizations exploit
these market conditions?  At some point, are innovative and deviant
strategies developed to maximize profit and minimize risk diffused
throughout the industry, thereby setting up the “new normal” and com-
petitive bar for success?  How do competitors resist the questionable
practices and operate within expected margins of acceptable conduct?
Corporate cultures, independent of executives and managers, dictate
values and orientations compatible with the business model.66  Further-
more, organizational factors determine whether corporations rely on
legitimate or criminal means for achieving these goals.67
Accordingly, businesses develop a distinctive normative position—
either a “culture of compliance” or a “culture of resistance” to criminal
law and regulatory requirements—to inform goal achievement.68
These symbolic goal orientations produce variations in ethical climates
or cultures that support law violations in the pursuit of economic goals.
These cultural orientations portraying illegal business practices in
favorable terms can thus become pervasive in an industry; that is, devi-
ance can become normalized.69
When corporations engage in criminal activities, they do so at the
risk of criminal and civil liability.70  As will be discussed more fully in
the next section, corporate policies and procedures serve as proxies for
corporate intentionality.  Corporations represent complex structures,
distinct subcultures, and goal orientations designed to carry out man-
dated responsibilities.  They implement policy-coordinating complex
tasks within a regulatory framework.  Corporate decisions by represent-
atives set into motion all activities of these business entities.  To the
degree an organization indoctrinates and pressures its members to
engage in violations of law consistent with these expectations, one
might find variable rates of white collar crimes being committed on
behalf of organizations rather than individuals.71
Coleman applied the routine activities perspective to the intersec-
tion of opportunity and motivation in a professional or business con-
text.72  Motivation refers to “symbolic constructions” that sponsor
organizationally-approved goals and activities.  A process of socializa-
tion communicates goal orientations that direct executives to take
actions, legal or otherwise, to protect and advance the interests of the
66. See Etzioni & Mitchell, supra note 56.
67. JAMES GOBERT & MAURICE PUNCH, RETHINKING CORPORATE CRIME (2003); see also
R C. Kramer, Corporate Crime: An Organizational Perspective, in WHITE-COLLAR AND ECO-
NOMIC CRIME: MULTIDISCIPLINARY AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Peter Wickman &
Timothy Dailey eds., 1982).
68. John Braithwaite, Criminological Theory and Organizational Crime, 6 JUST. Q. 333,
343 (1989).
69. SUTHERLAND, supra note 46; see also DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH
DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996).
70. John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, On the Plausibility of Corporate Crime Theory, in 2
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 15 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds., 1990).
71. Id.
72. See Coleman, supra note 20.
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corporation.  Coleman described opportunity as a “potential course of
action” that is made available by a particular set of social conditions
recognized by the actor to be choice.73  Thus, an individual’s position
within a social structure, as well as their personal cognitions and beliefs,
play important roles in crime.  Illegal opportunities increase in appeal
as profits increase, risks of detection decrease, and as rationalizations
for offending align with core beliefs or values.  Yet opportunities “are
only as good as those who would exploit them.”74
As demonstrated above, theories of white collar crime have
approached an explanation from various levels of analysis.  Sutherland
argued that individual involvement in white collar crime reflects a social
process of differential association and learning whereby offenders
acquire the “how to” and rationalizations needed to see offenses as nec-
essary, standard, and acceptable business practices.75  As part of any
normal process of learning business practices—selection, induction,
and promotion—white collar managers may order subordinates to
engage in illegal or unethical practices as a normal course of business.
In turn, the employee “learns specific techniques of violating the law,
together with definitions of situations in which those techniques may be
used.”76
A major concern is whether the employee selection process attracts
individuals with personality traits that either suggest a propensity to be
deviant (e.g., low self-control, impulsive risk takers, questionable moral
and ethical integrity, etc.) or traits likely to elevate them to positions of
authority; or, whether those in positions of influence confront eco-
nomic strain and blocked goals through individual or corporate devi-
ance.77  Some theorists attribute deviant cultures to the types of persons
attracted to the organizations;78 others argue the new hires are indoc-
trinated into the corporate world to accept deviant values and attitudes
as normative and standard business practices.79  Tackling this theoreti-
cal and empirical conundrum is beyond the scope of the current Arti-
cle.  In either case, inferential problems will persist until theoretical
models simultaneously estimate independent indicators of personality
traits and organizational cultures.
Problematic in either scenario though is that “techniques of neu-
tralizations” serve individuals well to dismantle any moral resistance
they might have to law violation, while at the same time justifying or
73. Id. at 409.
74. Peter Grabosky & Neal Shover, Forestalling the Next Epidemic of White-Collar Crime:
Linking Policy to Theory, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 641, 649 (2010).
75. BENSON & SIMPSON, supra note 6.
76. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 245 (1983).
77. Gross, supra note 52; see also Gerhard Blickle et al., Some Personality Correlates of
Business White-Collar Crime, 55 APPLIED PSYCHO. 220, 221 (2006) (finding that “[b]usiness
white-collar crime is predicated by gender (males higher rates than females), low behav-
ioral self-control, high hedonism, high narcissism, and high conscientiousness”).
78. Gross, supra note 52.
79. See Apel & Paternoster, supra note 48; see also CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 60.
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excusing their illegal behavior.80  Coleman argued that in corporate
cultures, these rationalizations and motivations are deeply rooted in the
“culture of competition.”81  The resulting orientation will cast laws and
regulations as cumbersome, ambiguous, unfair, or unnecessary.  For
example, people and organizations do not necessarily respond to new
criminal prohibitions with compliance,82 while resistance to law or reg-
ulation may nurture a “negative contagion” or more generalized disre-
gard for law.  Moreover, to the degree a criminogenic culture exists in a
business, it ensures that successive generations of employees know the
rules of the game: “It was a way of doing business before we ever got into
the business.  So it was like why do you brush your teeth in the morning
or something? . . . It was a part of the everyday . . . It was a method of
survival.”83  All told, if a culture of resistance or normalized deviance is
in place, criminal activity is likely to occur in the presence of favorable
opportunities in terms of suitable targets and minimal guardianship,
irrespective of the criminal propensities of individuals within the
workforce.
III. COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS
From the prior parts, it is evident that companies and industries
cannot blindly rely on their employees to maintain high levels of moral
reasoning and integrity, or to refrain from unethical or deviant behav-
ior, when the environments they work in may undermine their ability to
do so.  Yet, whether workplace cultures attract or normalize deviance,
or the structure and processes within them inadvertently contribute to
illegal practices, it is the responsibility of corporate leaders to imple-
ment some levels of internal control; relying on external controls (e.g.,
criminal law legislation, civil regulation, and enforcement) alone will
not suffice.  Administrative and regulatory rules are constantly evolving
and suggest the need for corporations to periodically review policies in
light of external changes that may impact compliance.  Effective policy
governance programs build-in regular review cycles to establish new
rules, to identify organizational impacts and to respond with compli-
ance.84  Compliance and ethics programming are cost-effective85
approaches companies can and do take to improve internal controls.
80. Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delin-
quency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664 (1957).
81. Coleman, supra note 20.
82. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968).
83. Michael L. Benson, Denying the Guilty Mind: Accounting for Involvement in a White-
Collar Crime, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 583, 591 (1985).
84. See OCEG, http://www.oceg.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2014) (example of con-
sulting firm).
85. Michael Volkov, Corporate Excuses to Avoid Compliance and Ethics Programs, COR-
RUPTION CRIME COMPLIANCE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/
2013/08/corporate-excuses-to-avoid-compliance-and-ethics-programs.  Volkv argues that
quality compliance programs can be cost-effective, despite executive resistance to change:
The cost of a robust compliance and ethics program is far below the cost of
insurance against an enforcement action or the cost of an enforcement action.
The opportunity cost of an enforcement action can be devastating to a company
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These proactive strategies help companies to implement policies that
are aligned with corporate objectives and minimize unnecessary risk
and liability.
A. Compliance
There are many sets of guidelines that lay out the necessary ele-
ments of an “effective” compliance program.  In addition to industry-
specific regulations, protocols, and standard operating procedures,
which encourage legally-compliant practices, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) surprisingly assist organizations as well—by
helping companies frame their operations to reduce potential penalties
for criminal conduct.86  The general foundation of the applicable
Guidelines is predicated on the concept that in order to have an effec-
tive compliance and ethics program, a company must promote an orga-
nizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and embraces a
commitment to compliance with the law.  This includes the obligation
to exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct.
Based on this general framework, there are seven minimum core ele-
ments for establishing an effective compliance program:
1) Compliance standards and procedures must be established to
prevent crime.
2) High-level personnel must be involved in oversight and knowl-
edgeable about the operations of the compliance structure.
3) Substantial discretionary authority must be carefully delegated.
4) Compliance standards and procedures must be communicated
to employees through education and training.
5) Reasonable steps must be taken to achieve compliance through
the establishment of monitoring and auditing systems, periodic
evaluations of the compliance program, and of reporting sys-
tems that provide anonymity.
6) Standards must be consistently enforced, utilizing appropriate
incentives and disciplinary measures.
7) Any violations require appropriate responses, which may
include modifications of compliance standards and procedures
or implementing additional preventative measures.87
For the most part, these Guidelines do not go above and beyond
what is required in most regulated industries.  For example, U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)-registered investment advisors
are subject to Rule 206(4)-7 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, as
amended, which requires advisors to adopt and implement written poli-
cies and procedures designed to prevent violations from occurring,
detect violations that have occurred, and correct promptly any viola-
– everything in a company is put on hold during the time that the company
devotes resources and attention to fending off a dangerous enforcement action.
Id.
86. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/index.cfm (last visited Apr.
25, 2014); see also 2012 Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www
.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_HTML/8b2_1.htm.
87. Id.
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tions that have occurred.88  Guidelines (1), (5), and (7) are virtually
identical to the obligations imposed by Rule 206(4)-7.  In addition,
Rule 206(4)-7 requires investment advisors to appoint a Chief Compli-
ance Officer who is “competent and knowledgeable regarding the
Advisers Act . . . empowered with the full responsibility and authority to
develop and enforce appropriate policies and procedures for the
firm.”89  Guideline (2), requiring the involvement of senior personnel,
is consistent with this obligation.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), which is
the self-regulatory organization that oversees broker-dealers, also has
similar rules requiring the implementation of supervisory systems and
controls to mitigate violations, including the National Association of
Securities Dealers’ (“NASD”) Rule 3010 (Supervision), NASD Rule
3012 (Supervisory Controls), and FINRA Rule 3130 (Annual Certifica-
tion of Compliance Supervisory Processes).90  When compliance with
the Guidelines and rules can be ascertained, corporations and execu-
tives can reasonably expect considerations with respect to criminal cul-
pability.  Yet much of what could be technically considered white collar
“crime” does not come under the purview of criminal law, nor rise to
the level of criminal prosecution.  There are other civil and regulatory
systems in place, however, to deal with similar deviant, unethical, and
illegal behavior.
The SEC’s Carlo di Florio outlined ten elements of an effective
compliance and ethics program from a regulatory perspective.  These
elements, which are based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, include
recommendations for: governance; culture and values; incentives and
rewards; risk management; policies and procedures; communication
and training; monitoring and reporting; escalation, investigation, and
discipline; issues management; and, an on-going improvement pro-
cess.91  In combination, the expectations outlined in the Guidelines
88. STAFF OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION OFFICE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT
ADVISERS (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rp
laze-042012.pdf.
Money managers, investment consultants, and financial planners are regulated
in the United States as “investment advisers” under the U.S. Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act” or “Act”) or similar state statutes . . . . The Advisers
Act is the last in a series of federal statutes intended to eliminate abuses in the
securities industry that Congress believed contributed to the stock market crash
of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s.  The Act is based on a congressionally-
mandated study of investment companies, including consideration of invest-
ment counsel and investment advisory services, carried out by the SEC during
the 1930s.
Id. at 1.
89. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-21 (2012).
90. See FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 25, 2014); see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD Rulemaking
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (stating, “As of July
30, 2007, NASD is now known as Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and
new rule proposals will be listed under FINRA.”).
91. Carlo V. di Florio, Director, S.E.C. Office of Compliance Inspections and Exam-
inations, The Role of Compliance and Ethics in Risk Management, U.S. SECURITIES AND
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(criminal) and by the SEC (civil; regulatory) tend to capture the stan-
dard by which corporations are required to operate, lest enhanced
exposure to law enforcement (e.g., Department of Justice) or regula-
tory (e.g., SEC) action and sanctioning.
In getting on board with these standards, it appears a few firms that
have been in the recent headlines for compliance failures have finally
decided to enhance their compliance departments and control staff.
HSBC, which was fined $1.9 billion USD by the U.S. Justice Department
for anti-money laundering and sanctions violations (that led to the
laundering of around $881 million USD in drug proceeds), recently
announced its intention to hire thousands of compliance staff.92
Although the firm’s total global workforce has declined by over 40,000
in the past two years, with these additions, the firm’s total compliance
staff will be over 5,000 or 2% of its total global workforce.93
JPMorgan Chase, whose infamous $6 billion USD “London Whale”
trading loss has led the bank to be the subject of four regulatory
enforcement actions and seven separate Department of Justice investi-
gations, also seems to now believe that enhancing its compliance and
“control staff” is “good business.”94  The Company announced its inten-
tions to spend $4 billion on compliance and risk management, which is
to be spent increasing risk-control staff by 30% and providing 750,000
hours of compliance training.95  Considering JPMorgan will pay a total
of approximately $920 million in penalties for its internal control fail-
ures,96 on top of the $18 billion USD it has spent on legal fees since
2008,97 one wonders if the compliance additions are too little too late.
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2011/spch101711cvd.htm.  di Florio explained:
In my first speech here at the SEC I outlined ten elements I believe make an
effective compliance and ethics program. These elements reflect the compli-
ance, ethics and risk management standards and guidance noted above. They
also reflect the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG), which were revised in
2004 to explicitly integrate ethics into the elements of an effective compliance
and ethics program that would be considered as mitigating factors in determin-
ing criminal sentences for corporations.
Id.
92. Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to pay $1.9 billion U.S. fine in money-laun-
dering case, REUTERS, (Dec 11, 2012 6:15 PM EST), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
12/11/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211.
93. Jaclyn Jaeger, HSBC to Hire Thousands More Compliance Employees, COMPLIANCE
WEEK, (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.complianceweek.com/hsbc-to-hire-thousands-more-
compliance-employees/article/313908/.
94. Jaclyn Jaeger, JPMorgan to Spend $4 Billion on Compliance and Risk Efforts, COMPLI-
ANCE WEEK, (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.complianceweek.com/jpmorgan-to-spend-4-bil-
lion-on-compliance-and-risk-efforts/article/311619/.
95. Id.
96. Press Release, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N, JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay
$200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC Charges (Sept. 19, 2013) available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965.
97. Jaeger, supra note 94.
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B. Ethics
What is ethics?  “Ethics” has multiple definitions, but it is generally
understood to be the principles of conduct governing an individual or group.
In an organizational setting, business ethics applies the “ethical princi-
ples” to operational activities and relationships between businesses, cli-
ents, and other stakeholders.  In addition to ethical duties, many
industries are further subject to “fiduciary duties.”  Someone with a
fiduciary responsibility is a person “who owes to another the duties of
good faith, trust, confidence, and candor.”98  When subject to a fiduci-
ary duty, one must act for the benefit of the person to whom he/she
owes such duty, to the exclusion of any contrary interest.  From a con-
ceptual viewpoint, there is a strong correlation between ethics and fidu-
ciary duty, both of which are integral to sound and legal financial
practices.  But this is not new insight.  As di Florio points out,99 the U.S.
Supreme Court stated almost five decades ago:
A fundamental purpose, common to [the federal securities] stat-
utes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi-
losophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry . . . “It requires but little
appreciation . . . of what happened in this country during the
1920’s and 1930’s to realize how essential it is that the highest
ethical standards prevail” in every facet of the securities
industry.100
Yet unethical practices persist.  Significant corollaries between the
stock market crash of 1929 and contemporary economic crises are bla-
tantly evident, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s concerns continue
to be applicable today.  Di Florio argues:
Of course, what has happened through the financial crisis I
believe is yet another reminder of the fundamental need for
stronger ethics, risk management and regulatory compliance prac-
tices to prevail.  Congress has responded once again, as it did after
the Great Depression, with landmark legislation to raise the stan-
dards of business ethics in the banking and securities
industries.101
It is easy to conclude that understanding business standards and setting
ethical behavior parameters within companies and industries remains
of utmost priority to facilitate an efficient and legally-operating finan-
cial system.
Consistent with the techniques of neutralization discussed in Part
II,102 there are a variety of reasons someone might act unethically:
sometimes it is hard to do what we know is right (courage), we all make
mistakes, too many pressures, cultural norms differ, “everyone else does
98. Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009).
99. Di Florio, supra note 91.
100. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963) (quot-
ing Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963)).
101. Di Florio, supra note 91.
102. Sykes & Matza, supra note 80.
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it” mentality, small favors turn into larger problems, and, the belief that
management does not care about course of action so long as you are
producing.  This latter “pressure to perform” rationale is also common
in many fast-paced industries: “[w]hen confronted with a clear choice
between right and wrong, people are five times more likely to do the
right thing if they have time to think about it than if they are forced to
make a snap decision.”103  The organization may also structure incen-
tives to deviate from conventional practices when the focus in on short-
term performance or unrealized gains in tight timeframes.
Ethical principles can be the basis for regulation in a number of
ways.  Explicit references include the requirement for investment advi-
sors and public companies to adopt a written code of ethics.  Other
rules and regulations may be based implicitly on an ethical foundation,
such as the rules adopted and enforced by self-regulatory organizations
such as FINRA, the National Association of Realtors, American Medical
Association, and the New York Stock Exchange.  The anti-fraud provi-
sions included in many bodies of law are also based on ethical founda-
tions, as well as in areas of law that enforce a fiduciary duty standard
(see above).
Many have said that “good ethics is good business.”  In light of the
recent financial crisis this catch-phrase has been used even more, and
standard-standard setting organizations, such as the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”), the
Ethics Resource Center (“ERC”), the Open Compliance and Ethics
Guidelines (“OCEG”), and the Ethics & Compliance Officer Associa-
tion, have published more guidance.  Expectations of ethical behavior
have risen around the world, both from regulators as well as the general
public. COSO, which is responsible for the standards of Internal Con-
trol and Enterprise Risk Management, argues:
An entity’s strategy and objectives and the way they are imple-
mented are based on preferences, value judgments and manage-
ment styles. Management’s integrity and commitment to ethical
values influence these preferences and judgments, which are
translated into standard of behavior. Because an entity’s good rep-
utation is so valuable, the standards of behavior must go beyond
mere compliance with the law. Managers of well-run enterprises
increasingly have accepted the view that ethics pays and ethical
behavior is good business.104
COSO also stated:
Management integrity is a prerequisite for ethical behavior in all
aspects of an entity’s activities.  The effectiveness of enterprise risk
management cannot rise above the integrity and ethical values of
the people who create, administer, and monitor entity activities.
103. Brian C. Gunia, Long Wang, Li Huang, Jiunwen Wang & J. Keith Murnighan,
Contemplation and Conversation: Subtle Influences on Moral Decision Making, 55 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 1, 13–33 (2012).
104. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK MAN-
AGEMENT FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 22.
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Integrity and ethical values are essential elements of [an entity’s]
internal environment, affecting the design, administration and
monitoring of other enterprise risk management components.105
This final remark by COSO is quite telling.  It is clear from a culture of
resistance and even a normalized deviance106 perspective that the orga-
nizational ethos permeates the rank and file from the top levels on
down.  Thus, the C-suite107 is originally and ultimately responsible for
setting and role-modeling the ethical and compliance expectations of
the company.
C. Tone at the Top
A demonstrated corporate culture that supports and provides appropriate
norms and incentives for professional responsible behaviour is an essential
foundation of good governance. In this regard, the board should take the
lead in establishing the “tone at the top” and in setting professional stan-
dards and corporate values that promote integrity for itself, senior manage-
ment and other employees.108
“Tone at the top” is a phrase utilized frequently when discussing an
effective corporate compliance program, but it can be difficult to
define.  It is easy to say, but hard to do, and even harder to prove—
especially for larger organizations where the “top” is further removed
from the day-to-day operations.109 Visualizing the hierarchical structure
of the tone at the top concept can help to demonstrate that various
levels of involvement are necessary to have an effective tone.  As the
graphic in Figure 2 depicts, all levels of an organization need to be
involved in risk management, ethical decision making, and professional
business practices in order for the tone itself to inspire and influence a
culture and climate of compliance with all employees throughout the
organization.
105. Id.
106. Coleman, supra note 20.
107. The C-suite is “[a] widely-used slang term used to collectively refer to a corpo-
ration’s most important senior executives. C-Suite gets its name because top senior execu-
tives’ titles tend to start with the letter C, for chief, as in chief executive officer, chief
operating officer and chief information officer.” See C-Suite, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www
.investopedia.com/terms/c/c-suite.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
108. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: PRINCIPLES
FOR ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 16-17 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs168.pdf.  For an example of a negative corporate “tone at the top,” see in Kris-
tie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice:  Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context of Iranian
Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 632 (2014).
109. ASSOC. OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, TONE AT THE TOP: HOW MANAGEMENT
CAN PREVENT FRAUD IN THE WORKPLACE, available at http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/
ACFE_Website/Content/documents/tone-at-the-top-research.pdf.
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FIGURE 2: TONE AT THE TOP
Leadership Team
Risk Committees
Compliance/Legal/Audit Team
All Employees
Board
If the proper tone is not set, it is generally only a matter of time
before a company self-destructs or, simply, gets caught.  Think of Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, and Gal-
leon Group—all companies who appeared to be at the height of their
game—until the walls came crashing down. In fact, since the economic
bust of 2008, scores of public and privately-held companies and their
chief executive officers (“CEOs”) have been charged with regulatory
violations and white collar crimes.  If the heads of these organizations’
C-suites had been unconcerned with or negligent in doing the right
thing or setting the proper tone, their mindset and behavior likely had
a trickledown effect of normalizing deviance, resulting in serious finan-
cial and legal issues, and ultimately for some, putting them out of
business.
As implied above, while “setting” an ethical tone at the top is neces-
sary for a compliance and ethics program to be successful (e.g., as indi-
cated in the U.S. Sentencing Guideline that high level personnel must
be involved in oversight), it is not enough on its own.  Part of setting
the tone at the top is ensuring that the tone is being received and
respected throughout the organization.  As the old adage states, “Trust
but Verify.”  Meaning, the company needs to control the circumstances
that would allow for unethical behavior (suitable targets; lack of guardi-
anship) and test that unethical behavior is not occurring.  Claiming
that you want employees to act ethically and that the company holds
itself to the highest ethical standards only goes so far—talk is cheap.
Employees need to know that they are being monitored and will be
held accountable to high behavioral standards.
When establishing an effective compliance program, industry spe-
cific practices are necessary to incorporate and are required by the
Guidelines: “An organization’s failure to incorporate and follow appli-
cable industry practice or the standards called for by any applicable gov-
ernmental regulation weighs against a finding of an effective
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compliance and ethics program.”110  While the size of the organization
may impact what resources are available to dedicate to compliance, the
Guidelines take this into consideration by allowing the formality and
scope of a compliance program to be tailored to the size of the organi-
zation.111  However, irrespective of industry (e.g., mortgage financers,
investment advisors, banks, health care) or company size, any credible
compliance program would include the following elements:
• Proper hiring – Before adding any new employees, a company
should vet candidates to ensure they are fit for the firm’s compli-
ance culture. This can include incorporating compliance person-
nel in the hiring process, requiring candidates to see an
industrial psychologist, completing full background and refer-
ence checks, all to review for signs/history of unethical behavior.
• Proper incentives – Compensation and other incentives should be
tied to long-term performance of the firm to avoid employee
decisions from being based on trying to make a “quick buck.”
Compliance personnel should also be involved in setting com-
pensation guidelines, or at minimum, should be able to review
the guidelines for any conflicts. Including compliance as an ele-
ment of an employee’s performance evaluation can also help
promote ethical behavior.
• Internal controls – To control the opportunities for bad behavior,
proper internal controls such as dual authorizations, segregation
of duties, and suitable reporting structures. These controls need
to be based on a company’s operations, but every type of com-
pany should have some form of controls in place.
• Internal audit program – Internal controls only work if they are
being followed. An internal audit program, which is required by
Guideline (5), can help confirm that internal controls are prop-
erly functioning and find areas that are in need of improvement.
Review of internal controls should be completed by someone
who is not responsible for completing the original task.
• Open dialogue – Open lines of communication throughout the
organization are necessary to set a proper tone at the top.
Employees need to feel comfortable bringing up issues or asking
questions or they are more likely to make mistakes and make the
wrong decision. A company’s compliance program also, as
required by Guideline (5), needs to provide, and publicize, a way
for employees to confidentially report information without fear
of retaliation (i.e., “whistleblower” policies).
• Empowered compliance staff – It is not enough just to say a company
has compliance staff to be compliant. Compliance staff, particu-
larly the head of compliance, needs to truly be empowered to
implement and independently enforce the company’s policies
and procedures, without unnecessary interference from the “bus-
iness staff.”
110. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, comment 2(B) (2013).
111. Id. at comment 2(C).
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• Formal and informal training – If employees are unaware of the
rules, how can they be expected to follow them? Training should
start on an employee’s first day and continue on a regular
basis—such as an annual training of the most important rules, to
informal training on a new or updated policy. Training can take
many forms, including a simple email reminder, to a formalized
presentation, and can be tailored to an employee’s job duties.
After implementing a compliance program, and regularly thereaf-
ter, companies need to assess whether the actions they have taken are
setting the appropriate tone at the top.  To do this, it can help to begin
with several basic questions:
• What quantitative measures are being used to complement quali-
tative evaluation of the tone at the top?
• Is the entity’s internal audit function performing assessments of
“soft controls” that could be used to help evaluate the tone at the
top?
• How do the entity’s processes for evaluating the tone at the top
compare to those of other entities that are viewed as leaders in
this area?
• Are employees’ perceptions of the tone at the top trending up,
trending down or flat?  How do they compare with employee
perceptions at similar or “leading” entities?
• Are there operating units or functions where employees’ percep-
tions of the tone at the top are much weaker than others?  If so,
why, and what remediation may be appropriate?112
Based on the answer to these questions, a company should deter-
mine what gaps exist, and how to improve the compliance program and
culture to develop a stronger tone at the top.  As demonstrated by
JPMorgan, HSBC, and a multitude of other companies, spending the
resources to have an appropriate compliance and control system in
place can save a lot of pain when something does go wrong.
D. Mortgage Finance Reform
Concern for legally-compliant and ethical business behavior and
practices has blossomed in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis.
So too has regulation.  Specifically, “Reforms stemming from the Dodd-
Frank Act will fundamentally change every aspect of the mortgage busi-
ness.”113  Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, as articulated by the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),114 have culminated in
112. 10 Ways to Measure the Tone at the Top, RISK & COMPLIANCE J., U.S., available at
http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/04/11/10-ways-to-measure-the-tone-at-
the-top/ (adapted from the Wall Street Journal).
113. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOC., ABA BACKGROUNDER: MORTGAGE REFORM INTO
2014, at 1 (2013).  The ABA adds: “Overall, ABA believes that the new regulations go a
long way in adding protections for consumers, but these reforms should aim to promote
stable and accessible mortgage markets that are predominantly supported by private
investment with reduced government involvement.” Id.
114. The CFPB was created in 2011 following the passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
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rules and regulatory amendments as well as time frames in which banks
must come into compliance.  The final mortgage rules are generally
centered within eight categories:115
1. Ability to Repay and “Qualified Mortgages”
2. Servicing (e.g., with respect to provisions of Regulation Z and
Regulation X)116
3. High Cost Mortgage Provisions
4. Higher-Risk Mortgage Appraisal Documentation
5. Appraisal Disclosure
6. Loan Originator Compensation
7. RESPA [Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974] -TILA
[Truth in Lending Act] Reforms
8. Fair Lending
The abundance of articulated and clarified housing finance regulation
should come as no surprise.  They are appropriate responses to many of
the deviant practices revealed throughout investigations into the mort-
gage crisis.  Narrative from the New York v. JPMorgan Chase case provides
a vivid illustration of how deception and intentional inattention to risk
became systemically problematic:
Even Defendants’ watered-down due diligence review could not
help but identify a large number of problematic loans.  Rather
than rejecting or replacing those loans, however, the Defendants
routinely ignored the defects . . . even when the QC [Quality Con-
trol] department did identify serious problems [during post-settle-
ment reviews], it failed to remove defective loans from the
securitizations . . . Indeed, far from making an effort to improve
their due diligence review – and thereby improve the scrutiny of
the loans they were purchasing—Defendants, as early as February
2005, began to reduce the amount of due diligence conducted “in
order to make us more competitive on bids with larger sub-prime
sellers.”117
Certain mortgage companies, including Ally Financial and its sub-
sidiaries (including GMAC Mortgage and Residential Capital), have
been ordered to improve their compliance programs and control pro-
cedures in response to the mortgage crisis.118  The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration issued an Order to Ally Financial demanding it:
submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable compliance program
and timeline for implementation to ensure that the operations of
115. AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOC., supra note 113.
116. 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013): “Regulation Z [ ] implements the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA). Regulation Z currently prohibits a creditor from making a higher-priced
mortgage loan without regard to the consumer’s ability to repay the loan.”
117. Complaint at 21-23, People v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ., No. 2768-2012
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2012).
118. Ally Financial Inc., GMAC Mortgage, LLC and Residential Capital, LLC: Mort-
gage Compliance Program, Prepared for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1 (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/ally-plan-sect8-mortgage-compliance-program.pdf.
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 75 Side B      05/20/2014   11:05:20
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 76 Side A      05/20/2014   11:05:20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-2\NDE205.txt unknown Seq: 27 14-MAY-14 12:39
2014] WHEN MORAL REASONING AND ETHICS TRAINING FAIL 575
the Mortgage Servicing Companies, including, but not limited to,
residential mortgage loan servicing, Loss Mitigation, and foreclo-
sure, comply with the Legal Requirements, as well as the Mortgage
Servicing Companies’ internal policies, procedures, and processes
and are conducted in a safe and sound manner.119
As part of this order, the Reserve Bank stated specific elements Ally
Financial needed to adopt, including outlining staff’s duties and
responsibilities regarding compliance, developing communication
practices regarding compliance-related items, developing procedures to
comply with various legal requirements, and setting up independent
testing for compliance with various requirements.
In addition to structural, policy, and procedural changes, the
Reserve Bank has also provided Ally Financial with guidance in four
critical areas: (1) firm-wide approach to compliance risk/management,
(2) independence of compliance staff, (3) sound practices for compli-
ance and testing, and, (4) responsibility of Board and senior manage-
ment for risk management and oversight.120  The concept of “culture”
is also mentioned in this Mortgage Compliance Program enhancement
plan, but specific guidance on how to implement or establish this more
compliant culture is arguably absent—suggesting that the tone at the
top is indeed, easy to say, hard to do, and even harder to prove.
IV. CONTROLLING OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVIANCE
Our job is to set a tone at the top to incent people to do the right thing and
to set up safety nets to catch people who make mistakes or do the wrong
thing and correct those as quickly as possible. And it is working. It is
working.
—Charles O. Prince III121
Between the Dodd-Frank legislation, new mortgage rules,
increased regulatory and industry attention to compliance and ethics,
and the direct/vicarious learning provided through legal actions (such
as the Ally Financial consent decree), reform in the way of decreased
mortgage fraud should be experienced within the U.S. housing finance
industry.  Yet based on the “wisdom” of Mr. Prince (whose bank, within
a year of this statement, was nearly brought down by $65 billion in
losses, with more than half of that due to its investment in MBSs, lax
controls, and incentive plans that promoted unwarranted risk taking),
one might conclude that rogue employees were specifically responsible
for the demise of the housing finance industry, and more generally, all
corporate malfeasance and white collar crime.  It has been demon-
strated and argued throughout this Article that this viewpoint could not
be further from the truth.  Despite the axiom from an unknown author
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id. at 5.
121. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags Even as It
Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at 34, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/11/23/business/23citi.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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that “the ethical man knows it is wrong when he does it . . . the moral man
would not do it,” even moral men might be pressured into or succumb to
deviance under certain circumstances.122
Granted, motivated offenders are a critical element in ensuring
that a criminal event comes to fruition, but systemic crime in occupa-
tional and organizational settings (illegalities which benefit, or are
untaken at the behest of, an organization) is unlikely in the absence of
a culture or subculture of normalized deviance.  As such, a reactive cor-
porate/industry control tactic of setting traps to catch people and cor-
rect their mistakes as Prince suggests, without attention to the deviant
opportunities presented to them, may simply perpetuate misguided and
ineffective compliance, ethics, or crime control strategies and
programming.
Furthermore, the demands of an organization often subordinate
individual intention, so punishing individuals will not be a sufficient
deterrent to corporate crime.123  Etzioni advances a communitarian
perspective consistent with this view of corporate or organization
responsibility for wrongdoing.124 Under this view, corporations should
face legitimate punishment when failing to fulfill their mandated
responsibilities; it is inappropriate to punish an individual for corporate
wrongdoing.  In fact though, a common defense strategy routinely
targets an individual (e.g., scapegoat) for corporate liability through
the “plausible deniability” of others.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act125 and
the Dodd-Frank Act go a long way in attenuating these types of con-
certed ignorance claims.
As demonstrated above, in addition to regulation and corporate
accountability, the adequate control of deviance requires a robust sys-
tem of ethics and compliance programming, and a tone at the top
which instills a normative culture of compliance.  Price and Norris sum-
marize these essentials:
Protective factors include a reliable auditing system, a strong inde-
pendent board of directors with monitoring functions, outside
qualified directors and working committees, an organizational cul-
ture stressing ethical conduct, strict enforcement of ethics, a rigor-
ous corporate compliance program, and senior leadership
commitment to ethical conduct.126
The other necessary ingredient in a more proactive crime preven-
tion strategy (especially when the essentials above might be absent or
weak) is the control of the opportunities for employees, managers, and
122. See e.g., PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 17 (1st ed. 2007).
123. Braithwaite & Fiss, supra note 70, at 342.
124. Etzioni & Mitchell, supra note 56, at 187-88 (arguing this view calls for achiev-
ing an appropriate balance between rights and responsibilities to stakeholders and the
community at large).
125. See generally A GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, http://www.soxlaw.com/
(last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
126. Price & Norris, supra note 65, at 542.
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executives to engage in criminal, resistant, or otherwise deviant behav-
ior in the first place.  For as Hurley and colleagues note:
Indeed, virtually all companies that have experienced major trust
violations had some, and often extensive, systems and processes in
place to produce trustworthy behavior (for example, compliance
procedures, quality checks, codes of conduct and ethics training).
However, as important as these systems and processes may be,
other elements undermined the companies’ ability to deliver on
their core responsibilities to stakeholders.127
The final mortgage finance rules outlined in the previous section, along
with risk retention requirements and GSE reforms,128 are indicative of
this type of attitude and subsequent situational approach to prevent
and control opportunities for deviance in the housing finance industry.
Current mortgage reforms encompass products (e.g., subprime
no/low documentation loans) and activities available and occurring at
vital points in the mortgage finance process that have been previously
identified as susceptible to fraud (suitable targets; no guardianship;
“hotspots”).  As designed, the developments tend to outline and clarify
required methods to ascertain homebuyer qualifications, improve
accountability and transparency, and facilitate a more symmetrical
structure of risk.  This mixture of regulation and restructuring is bound
to disrupt the criminal opportunities within home financing that were
so evident in the housing industry of the past two decades.  Targets are
less suitable (e.g., with more complete disclosure to consumers and
investors; when risk must be retained) and guardianship is improved
(e.g., more informed clientele; record documentation and retention
requirements).  Note that these changes do not directly target the
“motivated offender,” which is postulated as a necessary component of
a criminal event under Routine Activities Theory.  However, this is con-
sistent with other environmental crime-specific prevention strategies
that attempt to harden targets and/or improve guardianship to alter the
opportunity structure of crime.  By making targets less attractive and/or
less accessible, potential offenders are forced to reassess their percep-
tions on the viability of pursuing a given course of action or “opportu-
nity,”129 thereby indirectly influencing their motivation.
It is encouraging to note that there was a 25% decrease in mort-
gage loan fraud Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) from 2011 to 2012,
with a higher percentage of the 2012 total being credited to the cate-
gory of application fraud (the distribution of frauds was trending to a
concentration at the consumer level rather than within the finance
127. Robert F. Hurley, Nicole Gillespie, Donald L. Ferrin & Graham Dietz, Design-
ing Trustworthy Organizations, 54 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 75, 77 (Summer 2013).
128. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, comment (c) (2013).  Proposi-
tions requiring “securitizers retain portions of the credit risk of securitized assets” are
under debate.
129. Coleman, supra note 20, at 405.
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industry itself).130  For example, in 2009, appraisal fraud and/or mis-
representation compensated for 34% of the total mortgage fraud SARs,
and had fallen to 9% through 2012.131  This suggests that opportunities
for deviance within the mortgage industry (e.g., at the appraisal level)
may be less attractive to would-be offenders.
CONCLUSION
Even though Routine Activities Theory was originally applied to
direct-contact predatory crimes, it has also shown increased utility for
examining and explaining indirect-contact crimes, such as those found
in the housing finance industry.  Its consistency with the opportunity
perspective provides a rich framework for examining how individuals
and aggregates might take advantage of occupational, organizational,
and industrial routines and their potentially rewarding crime opportu-
nities, and in turn how these very opportunities may ultimately be
restructured to diminish the likelihood of crime.  General deterrent
strategies offered through ethics training, compliance programming,
and regulation can only go so far.  Deterrence is not only un-measura-
ble (based on something that does not occur), but the ability of offend-
ers to avoid detection and punishment unnecessarily emboldens would-
be offenders.132
When an industry or business can create barriers to offending
(e.g., target hardening), the ability of individuals to capitalize on poten-
tially rewarding crime opportunities is decreased.  Although there is the
possibility of the unintended consequence of crime displacement (e.g.,
reverse mortgage fraud) with a situational approach to crime preven-
tion, it trumps efforts to “un-motivate” potential offenders with corpo-
rate programming, jargon, and slogans (motivated offenders will always
seek opportunities via suitable targets in the absence of capable guardi-
anship).  Simply focusing on individuals, while ignoring the deviant
opportunities that the structures, processes, and social systems of indus-
tries and organizations create, will not improve fiscal accountability,
ensure fiduciary duties are met, or reduce occupational or organiza-
tional crime.
130. LEXISNEXIS, THE LEXISNEXIS 15TH ANNUAL MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT 10
(2013), available at http://mortgagefraudblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/15th-
Annual-Mortgage-Fraud-Report-LexisNexis.pdf.
131. Id. at 11.  Also, even though consumer fraud is damaging, every adequately
structured and functional industry should have mechanisms in place to effectively moni-
tor and detect customer/clientele crime.
132. Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deter-
rence, 30 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 123, 123–135 (1993), who argue that directly or
vicariously experiencing punishment avoidance is as critical, if not more than, experiencing
punishment.
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